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BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN EUROPE
Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have
none or a very remote relation. Hence she must be en
gaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which
are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, there
fore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by
artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her
politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of
her friendship or enmities.
(From George Washington's Farewell Address)
George Washington's admonition to avoid European alliances has not or
perhaps could not have been adhered to consistently. Thomas Jefferson and
John Adams also urged this policy of avoiding "entangling alliances." Al
though in the popular mind the United States is pictured as having abstained
from European Politics, this is not the complete picture. Since the incep
tion of this Republic we have engaged in armed action with European powers
six times.
According to Professor George H. Blakeslee, this policy of isolation
urged by the "Founding Fathers" was based upon their belief that the European
political system was different and opposed to that of the United States, and
also the belief that the European powers were militaristic, monarchical,
and constantly engaged in armed conflict or intriguing over the balance of
power.
•'•Isolationism in this paper means: Rejection of membership in the
League of Nations; non-entanglement in the political controversies of Europe
and Asia; non-intervention in the wars of those continents; neutrality,
peace, and defense for the United States through measures appropriate to
those purposes; and the pursuit of a foreign policy friendly to all nations
disposed to reciprocate. This is practically the same definition as Pro
fessor Charles A. Beard uses in American Foreign Policy in the Making (New
Haven, 1946), p. 17.
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The "Founding Fathers" seemed to have concluded, too, that the great distance
between this country and Europe rendered European quarrels unimportant to us.
Available evidence indicates that the "Fathers" were not adverse to "temporary
alliances" that would benefit the United States.2
This Republic was born of an alliance with France. It is the opinion
of Professor Blakeslee that the "Fathers" recognized the weaknesses of the
young Republic, and held that alliances could further weaken and divide the
nation. He asserts that the policy of isolation was meant to be temporary -
until the institutions of this country had been consolidated.
Concerning United States isolation and involvement in European affairs
Professor Peter H. Odegard states:
...Our physical isolation from Europe and our cultural ties
with European peoples have resulted in what can only be
described as an American geopolitical paradox. We have
combined a proclaimed policy of isolation with an actual
practice of participation in world affairs. Except for the
Crimean war we have been deeply involved in virtually
every major European War...
The American policy of "abstention" from European politics and her pre
dominance of interest in the Western Hemisphere was given expression by the
Monroe Doctrine. American government officials held that the national
interest could best be served by the young Republic concerning itself mainly
George H. Blakeslee, Recent Foreign Policy of the United States (New
York, 1925), pp. 15-20.
3Ibid., p. 21.
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Peter H. Odegard, American Government, Theory, Politics, and Constitu
tional Foundation (New York, 1960), p. 30.
^Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., American Foreign Policy
(New York, 1954), p. 4.
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with commercial relations with Europe.
The war of 1793, between Great Britain and France, raised the question
as to whether or not the United States was obligated under the treaties of
1778 to aid France. Washington's Cabinet seemed to have been divided over
the issue, with some favoring aid to the former ally and others not favoring
aid. When requested for an opinion by Washington, Alexander Hamilton replied
that the interests of the United States were foremost:
...That there is a right either to refuse or consent, as
shall be judged for interests of the United States...If there
be such an option, there are strong reasons to show that
the character and interests of the United States require
that they should pursue the cause of holding the operation
of the (French) treaties suspended...
A cautious foreign policy was necessary for the infant Republic if she
were to survive and grow. Self-interest required the United States' policy
of abstaining from European political involvement. A vast continent remained
to be settled, and many other domestic matters attracted the United States'
attention.
Mr. Paul Scott Mowrer, discussing isolation and cooperation between the
United States and Europe, states:
Both means have been employed by us in the past, more or
less in accordance with circumstances. We have remained
isolated when it suited our interests, and we have co
operated when it suited our interest. Of the abstract
Blakeslee, op. cit., p. 595.
Louis M. Sears, A History of American Foreign Relations (New York,
1927), p. 55.
arguments brought recently against cooperation, not
one, in my opinion, can be successfully upheld.8
The United States went about its task of conquering the vast interior
and then turned attention to establishing hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.
For all practical purposes, United States hegemony prevailed in this hemisphere
by 1900.9
American policy toward Europe before World War I was one lacking commit
ment to European politics and no expressed interest in showing its power in
that area.10 This policy of "isolation" did not recognize the implications
that a war in Europe would bring. The nature of the war of 1914 was different
from the other colonial struggles that the world had witnessed in the past.
The improved military technology caused this war to be the most destructive
up until that time.
Upon the outbreak of hostilities President Woodrow Wilson issued the
declaration that the United States would remain neutral.H Underestimation
of the nature and duration of the war is shown by President Wilson's state
ment:
A war with which we are having nothing to do, whose causes
cannot touch us; or as he later phrased it, it looked like
a natural raking out of the pent-up jealousies and rival
ries of the complicated politics of Europe.12
8Paul Scott Mowrer, Our Foreign Affairs (New York, 1924), p. 82.
Samuel F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York,
1955), pp. 432-447.
Snyder and Furniss, op. cit., p. 23.
11Ibid., p. 24.
12Foster Rhea Dulles, American Rise to World Power 1898-1954 (New York,
1954), p. 91.
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The difficulties of maintaining neutrality in the twentieth century
soon became apparent to Americans. As the struggle continued, it developed
that the United States would have a decisive influence on the outcome of
13
the war, whether she pursued a policy of intervention or non-intervention.
Under the conditions existing at that time neutrality meant the right to
trade with both the Central Powers and the Allied in all materials except
certain contraband having direct bearing on military warfare.
Wilson envisioned the United States' role as that of assuming responsi
bility for mediating the dispute. He also insisted that the United States
had an obligation to the rest of the world to remain neutral. "We are the
mediating nation," the President stated; it was the country's duty to remain
at peace so that it could exercise the full force of America - "the force
of moral principle."14 Following his above-stated line of reasoning,
President Wilson proposed a plan of a peace without victory which both sides
rejected. The introduction of underwater craft into the war by Germany
complicated the United States' position. The German's use of the submarine
in sinking contraband carrying merchant vessels, as well as passenger-carry
ing vessels — resulted in the loss of American lives.15
President Wilson sent a note to the German government demanding the





actually amounted to an ultimatum:
Unless the Imperial Government shall now immediately declare
and effect an abandonment of its present methods of sub
marine warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels,
the Government of the United States can have no choice but to
sever diplomatic relations with the German Empire altogether.1^
The German Government acquiesced, and until early in 1917, there were no
serious incidents involving Americans and German submarines.
It is the opinion of this writer that Wilson's position was contradic
tory — he professed with pious statements that the United States should not
become involved in the war — yet he did not prevent American citizens from
traveling on belligerent vessels, although this could lead to hostilities
between Germany and the United States. Another factor was that the Declara
tion of Paris, 1896, could not have possibly — not that it would have made
a great deal of difference — regulated submarine warfare. Therefore, inter
national law could not be cited concerning underwater craft.
United States neutrality was further complicated by British violations
of American vessels and the censorship of American mail. According to Samuel
Bemis, American bankers and munition makers were enjoying a profitable busi
ness with the belligerents.18 We might add, in fairness to the bankers and
munition makers, that other facets of the national economy were also profit
ing from the war.19 The fact was that the voices crying for an embargo were
16Ibid., p. 93.
17Snyder, op> cit., p. 27.
18Bemis, np, cit., p. 595.
19Ibid., pp. 600-603.
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"lost in the din." There was also increasing sympathy in the United States
for the Allied cause. Those favoring America's entry into the war on the
Allied side cited as a reason the danger of a German victory to the security
of America. Walter Lippmann, writing in 1943, stated that the other factors
making for war would never have carried the day:
If a majority of the American people had not recognized
intuitively, and if some Americans had not seen clearly,
what the threatened German victory could mean to the
security of the United States...20
William Jennings Bryan who resigned as Secretary of State over Wilson's
position concerning the war was not alone in his belief that the United States'
policy would lead to war. He insisted that selling munitions to the Allies,
extending them financial credits, denying German submarines the right to
attack contraband carrying marine craft, could not be construed as true
neutrality. But the war advocates carried the day, and the United States
22
entered the war on April 2, 1917.
President Wilson declared that the struggle was not limited to self-
interest on the part of the United States but also to promote liberty and
justice. He stated:
...a universal dominion of right by such a concern of
free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all
nations and make the world itself at last free. To
such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes,
everything that we are and everything that we have,
Htfalter Lippmann, cited in Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to World
Power 1898-1954 (New York, 1954), p. 98.
21Ibid., p. 98.
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Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New
York, 1950), pp. 629-630.
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with the pride of those who know that the day has come
when America is privileged to spend her blood and her
might for the principles that gave her birth and happi
ness and the peace that she has treasured. God helping
her, she can do no other.23
After the Allied victory over the Central Powers, Wilson saw his dream
shattered — the dream of a world organization to keep the peace and make
the world safe for democracy. Whether the United States Senate expressed the
prevailing mood of American citizens in not sanctioning the League of Nations
Covenant is not known, but the United States returned to the policy of "iso
lation" in matters of Europe which were not visualized as being in the
interest of the United States.
The punitive Treaty of Versailles, United States' rejection of the
League Covenant, and the violations of the Covenant by Germany, Japan and
Italy, paved the way for World War II. ^ Lloyd George, in his memoirs, held
that the Treaty of Versailles might have ushered in a long era of peace had
the post-war leaders grasped the opportunity.25
The early withdrawals from the League weakened it considerably and also
subsequent failure to take effective action against Italy in her campaign
against Ethiopia. The League could restrain small powers but had little, if
any, control over large powers.26
Woodrow Wilson, cited in Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of
the American People (New York, 1950), p. 643.
^Frederick L. Schuman, International Politics (New York, 6th ed.,
1958), p. 217.
25Ibid., pp. 217-225.
26Schuman, op. cit., pp. 218-225.
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The lack of support for the German Republic by America, Britain and
France aided in Hitler's march to power in Germany. According to some sectors
of opinion, it seemed that England and France wanted a favor from Adolf Hitler-
that he would prove to be an effective block to the Soviet Union.27 After
1929, Americans were involved in a grave domestic struggle (the great depres
sion) and domestic problems absorbed their attention.2**
So, with impunity, Adolf Hitler systematically destroyed the Treaty of
Versailles, later attacked and occupied other countries of Europe, thereby
precipitating what later became the Second World War, The United States,
following her steps in World War I, declared her neutrality. Neutrality
on
legislation was passed by the Congress in 1935 and amended in 1936 and 1937.
The Neutrality Acts prohibited in time of war between foreign states or of
civil strife, "United States exportation of arms, ammunitions, or implements
of war, as defined by the President's proclamation, to any part of such bel
ligerent state, or to any neutral port for transshipment to, or for the use
30
of, a belligerent country." Loans and credits were also prohibited to
belligerents by American nationals. The 1937 Neutrality Act gave the Presi
dent discretionary power to forbid the export of other materials to belli
gerents. The Neutrality Acts also covered other actions by this country that
31
might involve it in war.
27Ibid., p. 257.
no
^Snyder, op. cit., pp. 40-41.
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It is no doubt true that President Franklin D. Roosevelt recognized the
dangers involved in remaining aloof from the struggle against the Axis. Pro
fessor Beard suggests that the President sensed the prevailing isolationist
mood of public opinion; therefore, he treaded carefully.32 xhe Roosevelt
Administration attempted, between 1936 and 1941, to awaken the American
citizens to the danger of totalitarianism.33
Hitler and Mussolini were aware of the isolationist sentiments in the
United States. As a result, Roosevelt's warnings and appeals were largely
ignored by them. Actually the Neutrality Acts, when applied to Ethiopia and
the Spanish Civil War, helped the Fascists cause by also denying aid to the
victims of aggression. ^ As Italian and German armies attacked France, Mr.
Roosevelt declared:
On this 10th day of June, 1940, the hand that held the
dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor...
In our American unity, we will pursue two obvious and
simultaneous courses; we will extend to the opponents
of force the material resources of this nation, and at
the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of
those resources in order that we ourselves in the
Americas may have equipment and training equal to the
task of any emergency and every defense. All roads
leading to the accomplishment of their objectives must
be kept clear of obstructions. We will not slow down
or detour. Signs and signals call for full speed ahead.35
32Charles A. Beard, American Foreign Policy in the Making 1932-1940
(New Haven, 1946), pp. 17-39.
33Perkins, op. cit., pp. 137-142.
. Larry Leonard, Elements of American Foreign Policy (New York,
1953), p. 245.
^Franklin D. Roosevelt, cited in Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise
to World Power 1898-1954 (New York, 1954), p. 191.
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Roosevelt was unable to shake loose the isolationist hold on the Con
gress until March, 1941. At this time the Lend-Lease Act was passed which
provided for aid to the Allied powers.36 This appeared, at that time, to
have been the eleventh hour for England.
Evidence seems to lend credence to the thesis of Walter Lippman that
until 1945 the United States approached foreign affairs with the main ideas
of provincial America. These were the ideas held before America became a
Great Power. These ideas, he contends, are the traditional and fundamental
themes of American foreign policy now called isolationism.37
That the United States has been traditionally aloof from European
affairs when those affairs were not in her interest, there is no doubt, but
that aloofness precluded cooperation is a myth. The term American abstention
from Europe is really at best a half-truth, for we have involved ourselves in
European affairs many times. In this writer's opinion the reasons for the
United States not having involved itself more frequently in European affairs,
as cited in this paper, are the following: (1) A large interior to settle;
(2) all of the Americas to establish hegemony over; (3) four thousand miles
of ocean between it and Europe; and (4) enlightened self-interest.
The fruition of Wilson's dream of a United States exercising world
leadership had to await the aftermath of the great holocaust — World War II.
36Leonard, op. cit., p. 261.
37
Walter Lippmann, Isolation and Alliances (Boston, 1952), p. 8.
CHAPTER II
UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS SINCE 1945
An understanding of United States-Soviet relations since 1945 requires
some knowledge of the relationship prior to that date.
The American Government welcomed the overthrow of the corrupt and
tyrannical Czarist regime. According to Professors Richard Snyder and Edgar
Furniss, the establishment of a "so-called" democratic government by Kerensky
in March, 1917, would render public opinion more favorable to America's
entry into World War I on the Allied side. United States participation could
then be described as a crusade by the democratic governments to eliminate
tyranny.
In a move designed to strengthen the Kerensky government, and keep it
in the war against Germany, the United States advanced cash and credits to
it.2
Professor Frederick L. Schuman asserts that by October, 1917, the
Kerensky government had lost most of its political support, and the support
of the army and navy.^ It seemed that America's Ambassador Francis under
estimated the following and strength of the Bolshevik Party. On the morning
1Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, American Foreign Policy (New
York, 1954), pp. 580-581.
Frederick L. Schuman, Russia Since 1917 (New York, 1957), p. 79.
3Ibid., p. 91.
^Snyder and Furniss, op. cit., p. 580.
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of November 7, 1917, the Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, proclaimed the overthrow
of the Kerensky government.
The Communist rulers of Russia signed a separate peace treaty with the
Germans, published the secret treaties of 1915-16, which, among other factors,
exposed the "war to end wars" as a war for markets and repudiated the war
debts and pre-war obligations to foreign creditors and the confiscation of
all foreign-owned properties and investments. The above, coupled with an
appeal for workers of the world to revolt, sent a chill through the Western
Powers. Professor Schuman states:
...When the Allies failed to respond to Trotsky's overtures
for general peace negotiations, he published, out of the
Tsarist archives, the 'secret treaties' of 1915-16, which
even the most casual reader could interpret as meaning that
the sanctimonious 'war to end war1 and 'make the world safe
for democracy' was in fact a war for markets, spheres of
influence, annexations, and the other customary stakes of
'capitalistic' power politics...7
The appeal for workers of the world to revolt stated:
The army of the Russian Revolution derives its strength from
countless reserves. The oppressed nations of Asia are as
eager for the fall of the regime of capitalistic oppression
as are the oppressed proletarian masses of Europe. To fuse
these forces in a world revolution against the imperialis
tic bourgeoisie is the mission of the Workers' and Peasants'
Russia. The flame of the Petrograd November Revolution will
inevitably grow into a fiery hurricane that will strike to
the ground the sword of this piratic war and turn the dominion
of capital to ashes.^
The Soviets also appropriated two million rubles to promote international








Within the Soviet Union the situation was one of confusion; Ukrainians,
Reds, Whites, Czechs, and Germans were fighting battles on several fronts.
United States policy-makers were unable to decide what course of action to
take against the menace of Communism. United States policy-makers wanted to
"strangle" the Soviet Union at its birth.10 On the other hand, many United
States policy-makers felt that the Reds would not be able to win the struggle
against its combined opposition.
According to George F. Kennan, Wilson was opposed to American troops
being used to aid in defeating the Bolsheviks. It seems that Wilson handled
the problem unwisely by failing to consult the allies after reaching a de
cision to intervene. Instead he made an agreement with the Japanese to go
into Siberia jointly. After the United States informed the allies of its
decision to dispatch troops, the latter also sent troops. The manifested
purpose for sending troops was the evacuation of the two Czech divisions and
to prevent the Japanese from gaining control of the area. ^ The record, as
presented by Major General William S. Graves, who commanded the eighty-five
hundred American troops dispatched to Siberia, does not bear this assertion
out. He stated:
The only logical conclusion one, who was present in Siberia
during the intervention and knew the sidelights, can come
to is that the main reason for intervention was not made
9David Shub, Lenin (New York, 1948), p. 166.
10Schuman, op. cit., p. 94.
George F. Kennan, The Decision to Intervene (New Jersey, 1958),
pp. 405-08.
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Schuman, op. cit., p. 110.
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public. The action of the representatives of the allies,
as well as that of the Consul General of the United States,
justifies the belief that all allied and associated nations
had in mind to check the spread of Communism when troops
went to Russia. As a further proof of this statement,
there was and is a widespread belief, in the United States,
at least, to this effect. After the Armistice there was
no effort made to conceal the fact that allied troops were
trying to destroy bolshevism. As a matter of fact, this was
the only logical reason that can be advanced for keeping
foreign troops in Siberia."
It is no doubt true that the allied command wanted the Czechs evacuated
to fight on the Western front. After the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of
Brest-Litovsk ending its part in the war with Germany, the Czechs were not
serving any useful purpose in the war effort. The combined efforts of
the Allies, perhaps, could have disposed of Lenin, but the war and lack of
agreement among the allies on a definite plan of action resulted in Lenin's
victory.
The foreign policy of the United States toward Russia in 1918 was one
of isolating her from other European states and non-recognition. The
policy of non-recognition of the Soviet government continued until 1933. The
Soviet government exhibited its hostility toward the United States and other
capitalist nations. This hostility was very evident by the formation of
Communist parties in other countries — parties that pledged primary alle
giance to the Comintern, which had its headquarters in Moscow.17
■*""Tlajor General William S. Graves, America's Siberian Adventure (New
York, 1931), pp. 192-95.
Kennan, op. cit., p. 137.
15Ibid., pp. 408-429.
Snyder and Furniss, op. cit., p. 581.
17Ibid., pp. 580-81.
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A number of American businessmen established relations with the Soviet
government — as soon as the Soviets could gather a few rubles — prior to
recognition. Americans responded to the relief program during the Russian
famine of 1922. The above factors and the low trade level of the depression
made recognition less difficult for the Roosevelt Administration on November
I Q
16, 1933. Recognition in 1933 had been long overdue. Even before 1933, it
had become apparent to Western statesmen that the Communist regime was not
going to be overthrown. Non-recognition was delayed partly by the Wilsonian
concept of applying moral criteria to recognition.
From 1933 to 1939, the United States and the Soviet Union carried on
fairly normal relations. Relations between the two countries became strained
in 1939. After the Soviets signed a non-aggression pact with Germany which
enabled Hitler to attack and destroy Poland and turn his armed might upon
Britain and France.^ The Soviets in turn invaded Finland — which fought the
mighty Red Army to a standstill for a while — and finally occupied the
little country. This aggression on the part of the Soviet government created
an unfavorable attitude in the United States.
The Soviet leaders had expressed fear and concern about the rise of
n -1
fascism, hence their support of the League of Nations. It is generally
■^Schuman, op. cit., p. 166.
19Ibid., p. 146.
20Lawrence H. Chamberlain and Richard C. Snyder, American Foreign
Policy (New York, 1948), pp. 538-41.
Schuman, op. cit., pp. 163-64.
17
agreed that the Soviet-German rapprochement was made by the Soviet government
22
to buy time for the coming struggle with the Germans.
In June, 1941, Hitler attacked the Soviet Union; this placed American
foreign policy in a difficult position. Should the United States offer lend-
lease assistance to the Soviet Union? Many high-ranking diplomatic and
military leaders predicted that the powerful Wehrmacht would conquer the
Russians in perhaps ten weeks." Why not increase shipments to Britain rather
than waste them on Russia? The Roosevelt Administration made the decision to
send lend-lease to the Soviet Union and the British government was in agree
ment. The goal was to defeat Germany and any help was welcomed. The formal
agreement among America, Britain, and Russia climaxed in the United Nations
Declaration of January 1, 1942.
The Soviet Union suffered greatly from the invading German Army. On
the morning of June 22, 1941, Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister informed
the Russian people:
Today at 4 a.m., without any claims having been presented
to the Soviet Union, without a declaration of war, German
troops attacked our country...This war has been forced
upon us not by the German people, not by German workers,
peasants, and intellectuals, whose suffering we well un
derstand, but by the clique of bloodthirsty Fascist
rulers of Germany...This is not the first time that our
people have had to deal with an attack of an arrogant foe.
At the time of Napolean's invasion...our people's reply
22Ibid., p. 286.
23Snyder, op. cit., p. 584.
24Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to World Power 1898-1954 (New York,
1955), pp. 208-09.
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was War for the Fatherland...The Red Army and our whole
people will again wage victorious war for the Father-
land...25
It is estimated that the Soviet Union suffered at least a ten per cent
loss in population and many billions in property damage.26 it is also esti
mated that the Soviet Union incurred heavier losses than the combined losses
of all other belligerents of World War II. Perhaps this can, in part, ex
plain the Russian attitude after World War II.
Much is made of the war-time disputes between the United States and the
Soviet Union, but little (understandable in the present climate) is said of
the cooperation of the two. We can point to the cooperation of the two
countries, the United States and the Soviet Union. Both fought Hitler to
total defeat. They also agreed on lend-lease, the undesirability of a Polish-
Czech federation, Teheran, and the awarding of honors by the Soviet Union to
American officers and vice versa. The United States and the Soviet Union
28
cooperated in many other ways that are not necessary to list here.
Admittedly, there were many war-time disputes between the United States
and the Soviet Union. The United States was not allowed to see Soviet battle
plans; the Russians wanted lend-lease supplied in greater quantities, a
25V. M. Molotov, "An address to the Russian People", cited in Frederick
L. Schuman, Russia Since 1917 (New York, 1957), pp. 277-278.
26Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York, 1948), pp. 293-
94.
27Schuman, op. cit., 298-305.
28Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Tides of Crisis (New York, 1957), p. 105.
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second front in Europe, and refused any invasion route except across the
English Channel.29 The Soviets were suspicious of the Allies and they
wondered whether the West wanted the Germans to inflict as much damage as
possible.3° The Russians received the brunt of the Wehrmact from June, 1941,
until June, 1944. The landings in Italy in 1943, and Africa in 1942, were
not regarded as a second front.31
The United States' ambassador in Moscow charged (March 8, 1943) that
the Soviet government was keeping the Russian people ignorant of the scope
and magnitude of United States aid. The above disputes and the myth circu
lated in Russia that the Red Army and its equipment alone turned back the
32
German tide contributed much to postwar tensions between the two countries.
The United States was not without fault. It withheld military and
political information from the Soviets. And the abrupt termination of the
33
lend-lease program to Russia did not make matters better.
It seems that after Germany's defeat became apparent, the Soviet leaders
began political planning for dominating Eastern Europe. The "underground"
groups in Europe which were dominated by communists began attempting to seize
the governments in their respective countries. These were the countries
freed of German Armies.34 Conversely, Americans subordinated the winning of




32Snyder and Furniss, op. cit., 585.
33George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (Chicago, 1951), p. 76.
34Berle, op. cit., pp. 102-08.
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the war to political considerations. There was considerable alarm over the
political activities of the Soviet armed forces and pro-Soviet groups; hence the
Yalta conference was called. Roosevelt wanted political considerations to
wait until after the war.
The end of World War II, in 1945, saw the return of power politics. The
United States emerged as the strongest nation on earth militarily and economi
cally. The Soviet Union, although suffering heavy losses in life and property
at the hands of the Wehrmact, emerged the second greatest power. The post
war power struggle between East and West hinged upon the provisional character
of the status quo. The considerations are primarily political in nature;
Germany, the Eastern European countries, and other problems.->D
Hans J. Morgenthau states that there are three logically possible
answers to the question of the real issue between the Soviet Union and the
United States: (1) No real political issue separating the two, just propaganda
and suspicion; (2) World revolution to which the Soviet Union is irrevocably
committed; (3) Russian imperialism, which is used for world revolution by the
Soviet Union."
This writer follows practically the same line of reasoning as George F.
Kennan on the primary cause of the differences between the Soviet Union and
35Ibid., p. 106.
■Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 384.
37




...The next fact we must note is the congenital and deep-
seated hostility of the Soviet regime to the older and
larger countries of the Western World, and particularly
to the United States. There has been much argument as to
what caused this hostility: whether it was a preconcep
tion of the communist movement or whether it was something
provoked by western policies toward the Soviet regime in
the years of its infancy. Actually, both factors enter
in, but the more important of the two has been by far the
ideological prejudice entertained by the Soviet leaders
long before they seized power in Petrograd in 1917....38
The "Cold War" and the nature of the ideological struggle will be dealt
with in the following chapter.
38George F. Kennan, Realities of American Foreign Policy (Princeton,
1954), p. 68.
CHAPTER III
THE "COLD WAR" AND SOME AREAS OF TENSION
There are at the present time two great nations in the
world, which started from different points, but seem to
tend toward the same end. I allude to the Russians and
the Americans... Their starting-point is different and
their courses are not the same; yet each of them seem
marked out by the will of heaven to sway the destinies
of half the globe.
Alexis De Tocqueville in Democracy in America
At the end of World War II, in 1945, the United States emerged as the
strongest nation on earth, militarily and economically. The Soviet Union,
although suffering heavy losses in life and property at the hands of
Wehrmacth, entered the world stage as the second most potent power after
World War II.2
Many in the West held high hopes that the Soviet Union would cooperate
3
with other nations to create a world of peace through the United Nations.
This was not to be. It became apparent in 1946, that the war-time agreements
between the allies had been expressed in such vague terms that they were
left open to a number of interpretations, including contradictory ones.
1Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., American Foreign Policy
(New York, 1954), p. 55.
2Ibid., p. 55.
3Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New
York, 1950), p. 85.
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President Franklin D. Roosevelt knew in March, 1945, that the Soviet Union
was taking over in Poland and Rumania contrary to the United States' inter
pretation of the Yalta pledges. As early as January 6, 1945, President
Roosevelt made the following prophecy:
We delude ourselves, if we believe that the surrender
of the armies of our enemies will make the peace we
long for. The nearer we come to vanquishing our
enemies, the more we inevitably become conscious of
differences among the victors.5
The split between the Soviet Union and the West was brought into the
open by the failure to arrive at a peace settlement. In September, 1945, the
foreign ministers of the victorious nations met in London to begin work on an
Italian peace treaty. The principal opponents, V. M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign
Minister, and James F. Byrnes, United States Secretary of State, could not
agree on procedural matters. After three weeks of futile negotiations, the
meeting was adjourned.6 Three subsequent foreign ministers meetings and more
than a year after the Second World War, the Paris peace conference met. At
this meeting five peace treaties were drafted, they were the Hungarian, Bul
garian, Rumanian, Finnish, and Italian.
The United States temporary monopoly of the atomic bomb, bomber bases
within striking distance of the Soviet Union, the halt of lend-lease ship
ments, and the failure to lend the Soviets 6,000,000,000 dollars added to
TCbld., p. 858.
5L. Larry Leonard, Elements of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1953),
p. 282.




Soviet distrust of the United States.0
Perhaps the first indication that the Soviet Union was gaining advan
tages by acting unilaterally was her actions in Eastern Europe. The events
of World War II in Europe laid the foundation for Soviet influence in
Eastern Europe after the war. The Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe
attempted to reach some agreement between Russia and the Western powers which
9
would leave the liberated countries free to determine their own governments.
By this agreement the United States, Britain, and Russia were to "consult
together" on measures taken in the liberated countries. Free elections were
to be held in these liberated countries under the supervision of the three
great powers.10 With the Soviet army in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania, governments friendly to the Soviet Union were
set up. Although there were no Red army troops in Yugoslavia, Marshal Josip
Broz Tito followed a pro-Soviet policy. The fall of the Czechoslovakan
government in 1948 completed Soviet subjugation of the Eastern European
countries, Professor John G. Stoessinger asserts:
...During the last two years of the war, preparations
were worked out for the satellization of eight
Eastern European countries. In carrying out this ob
jective, the Soviet Union operated in three stages:
first, a genuine anti-Nazi resistance coalition was to
be formed with existing socialist and peasant parties;
8
Ibid., p. 858.
^Frederick L. Schuman, Russia Since 1917 (New York, 1957), p. 311.
10Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to Power 1898-1954 (New York, 1954),
p. 225.
nJohn G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations (New York, 1961), p. 52.
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second, the Communist Party would attempt to split
the opposition parties by exploiting regional and
ethnic jealousies, thereby transforming the coali
tion into a bogus alliance controlled by the Communist
Party; and finally, a coup d'etat would establish
complete Soviet control.12
The Soviet Union had also reverted to its pre-war policy of world revo
lution which added to postwar tensions between Russia and the West. The War
had weakened Britain and France to the extent that they could not provide
European leadership.13 The economies of the two countries were near exhaus
tion. The United States, then the most powerful nation, was forced into a
position of leadership.1^ Whether she wanted it or not the United States
had the mantle of leadership thrust upon her. American foreign policy had
to assume a new role, that of major concern in European politics.
As the expansionist policies of the Soviet Union became apparent the
deterioration of the United States' military power became a cause for grave
concern to foreign policy makers. The United States had quickly demobilized
her armed forces after World War II, so that in July, 1946, she had just above
one and one-half million men in the army.15 On the other hand, the Soviet
Union had about six million men in the army and her aircraft industry had
undergone re-tooling. The feeling in the West can perhaps best be shown by
the two extreme positions taken, one by Sir Winston Churchill, speaking in
12Ibid., p. 51.
13William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, United
States Foreign Policy 1945-1955 (Washington, D. C, 1956), pp. 202-203.
Acheson, Power and Diplomacy (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 6-7
15Dulles, op. cit., p. 222.
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Fulton, Missouri, March 5, 1946:
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic
an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.
All these famous cities and the populations around
them lie in the Soviet sphere and are subject, in one
form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to
a very high and increasing measure of control from
Moscow. Athens alone, with its immortal glories, is
free to decide its future at an election under British,
American and French supervision...If the Western demo
cracies stand together in strict adherence to the
principles of the UN charter, their influence for
furthering those principles will be immense, and no one
is likely to molest them...If the population of the
English-speaking Commonwealth be added to that of the
United States, with all that such cooperation implies
in the air, on the sea, and in science and industry...
there will be an overwhelming assurance of security...
Fraternal association requires not only growing friend
ship and mutual understanding between our two vast but
kindred systems of society, but the continuance of the
intimate relations between our military advisers...It
should carry with it a continuance of the present
facilities of all naval and air force bases in the
possession of either country all over the world.16
He concluded by saying: "Neither the sure prevention of War, nor the continuous
rise of World organization will be gained without...a special relationship be
tween the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States." This
position called for an organized bloc outside of the United Nations to halt
Soviet expansion. Mr. Wallace took the position which has been called the
18
"soft" line-which was an effort toward understanding between the super powers -
16Winston S. Churchill, Speech at Fulton Missouri, cited in Frederick
L. Schuman, Russia Since 1917 (New York, 1957), pp. 350-352.
17Winston S. Churchill, Speech at Fulton Missouri, cited in William
Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, United States Foreign
Policy 1945-1955 (Washington, D. C, 1956), p. 89.
18'Dulles, op. cit., p. 228.
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he stated:
...Enemies of yesterday and false friends of today
continually try to provoke war between the United
States and Russia...On our part, we should recog
nize that we have no more business in the political
affairs of Eastern Europe than Russia has in the
political affairs of Latin America...Under friendly
competition the Russian world and the American world
will become more alike...Russia must be convinced
that we are not planning for war against her and we
must be certain that Russia is not carrying on ter
ritorial expansion or world domination through
native communists... "
This position asserted that some blame for the "Cold War" fell to the
United States and that agreement was possible if confidence between the two
parties could be restored. We must hasten to point out that Mr. Wallace's
position was not the policy of the Truman administration. In fact, Secretary
of State James Byrnes felt that the official position of the United States was
20
being undermined at the Paris Peace Conference. According to Professor
Frederick L. Schuman, Mr. Truman had endorsed Secretary Wallace's speech but
after the storm broke over the speech Mr. Truman said he had only supported
Mr. Wallace's right to make the speech.21 On September 20, 1946, Secretary
22
Wallace was asked to resign.
Soviet controlled regimes in Eastern Europe brought to realization an
age-old Slavic dream.2^ And the Soviet Union was now in control of half of
Reitzel, op. cit., p. 90.





Europe and the "Power" on the continent. Ironically enough, the doctrine of
"unconditional surrender" aided in Soviet mastery of half of Europe.2^
Professor Schuman takes the position that American policy-makers were blinded
by "legalistic moralistic abstractions," and were unable to face the issue
until too late.25
Churchill understood the implications of Soviet domination of Eastern
Europe and sought to check or limit Soviet aggrandizement by opening the
second front through the Balkans. Both Moscow and Washington vested this
idea. Churchill then worked out an agreement with Joseph Stalin, whereby
the British would not be excluded completely from the Eastern European countries,
Discussing British influence in Eastern Europe with Stalin, Churchill relates
the following:
...Let us settle about our affairs in the Balkans. Your
armies are in Rumania and Bulgaria. We have interests,
missions, and agents there. Don't let us get at cross-
purposes in small ways. So far as Britain and Russia
are concerned, how would it do for you to have ninety
per cent predominance in Rumania, for us to have ninety
per cent of the say in Greece, and go fifty-fifty about
Yugoslavia? While this was being translated I wrote


















27Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy (Boston, 1953), pp. 226-227,
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President Roosevelt and his advisors felt that political considerations should
be dealt with after the war. And that all allied efforts should be directed
toward winning the war. The Soviet policy-makers did not view the problem in
28
the same light as the Americans.
As indicated earlier Eastern Europe is one of the key points of conflicts
between the Soviet Union and the United States. This area is a vital security
zone for the Soviet Union. The United States has faced the fact that the
Soviet Union has special interests in Eastern Europe, but does not accept the
idea of complete Soviet domination in that area. ° American foreign policy
makers had hoped for free elections and governments by the majority in this
area. Governments controlled by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe posed a
threat to the democratic regimes in Western Europe and ultimately to the United
States. Viewing the problem of Eastern Europe through the eyes of the Soviets
one arrives at a different conclusion. The Soviets feel that the interests of
the United States are not crucial in Eastern Europe and the area does not con-
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cern the United States.
George F. Kennan places the blame, in part, for the Eastern European
problem on the manner in which the war was allowed to end. He states:
^Stoessinger, op. cit., p. 51.
29Lawrence H. Chamberlain and Richard C. Snyder, American Foreign Policy







I would know of no basic issues of genuine gravity be
tween Russia and the West other than those arising
directly from the manner in which the recent World War
was allowed to come to an end. I am referring here
particularly to the fact that the authority of a United
German government was expunged on the territory of
Germany itself and throughout large areas of Eastern
Europe, and the armies of the Soviet Union and the
Western democracies were permitted to meet in the middle
of this territory and to take control of it before
there was any adequate agreement among them as to its
future permanent status. This was of course, the
combined result of the unconditional surrender policy,
which relieved the Germans of all responsibility for
the future status of this area, and the failure of the
allied governments to arrive at any realistic under
standings among themselves while the war was on. Since
it has not been possible to reach such understandings
subsequently, except in the case of Austria, the pro-
visorium flowing from these circumstances had endured.
It is this that we are faced with today.33
Thus, a power vacuum was created in Eastern Europe by the demise of Germany
and here again, the Western powers and Russia ran into the problem of words
and their meanings.
The question of a German peace treaty, according to Kennan, stands at
the center of United States - Soviet tensions.34 Allied with the matter of a
German peace treaty were the problems of reparations, and the rearmament of
Germany. From all indications, the fall of Germany in the Spring of 1945,
35
found the United States without a definite official policy for that country.
At the Quebec meeting in 1944, the then Secretary of the Treasury, Henry
Morgenthau, revealed the so-called "Morgenthau Plan" for Germany. This plan
proposed that Germany be stripped of all industrial plants, that the Ruhr coal





Chamberlain, op. cit., p. 581.
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mines be closed, that Germans be used as forced laborers abroad, that the
country be dismembered and reduced to a pastoral economy.^6
Although the "Morgenthau Plan" had important supporters in Washington,
it was never adopted by the State Department. A few months prior to Germany's
surrender several decisions regarding the nation had been taken at Yalta. They
were:
...The Russo-Polish boundary was fixed at roughly the
Curzon line and Poland was promised "substantial ac
cessions of territory in the North and West; Germany was
divided into separate zones of occupation coordinated
by an allied control council in Berlin; France was ad
mitted as the fourth occupying power; broad principles
of disarmament and denazification were agreed to; war
criminals were to be punished; and Germany was to be
assessed reparation in kind for damages inflicted.
German industry that could be used for military pro
duction would be eliminated or controlled....3'
The Yalta proposals above clearly advocated destroying the industrial power of
Germany and thereby weakening the economy. Joint Chiefs of Staff 1067 served
as occupation policy for the American Zone until superseded in July, 1947.
At the Potsdam Conference of July 17-August 2, 1945, attended by Truman
and Byrnes, Stalin and Molotov, Churchill and Eden, Clement Attlee and Ernest
Bevin joined the meeting after the Labor party victory in England - Soviet
and Western views clashed head-on.39 The differences between East and West
were brought more into the open. The essential provisions of the Potsdam
36Ibid.. p. 581.
37Ruhl J. Bartlett, The Record of American Diplomacy (New York, 1947),
pp. 663-664.
38
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Schuman, op. cit., p. 313.
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Dulles, op. cit., p. 223.
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accord may be summarized as follows:
Germany was to be disarmed and demilitarized completely;
war criminals were to be punished, and Nazi officials,
party structure and doctrine were to be destroyed. Great
Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union agreed
on the 'elimination of all German industry that could be
used for military production. ' Every effort was to be
made to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German
political life on a democratic basis and for Germany's
peaceful cooperation in international life. The victors
looked toward the decentralization of the political
structure and the development of local self-government
based on democratic principles; all democratic political
parties with rights of assembly and public discussion
were to be permitted. Representative and elective prin
ciples were to be introduced in regions, provinces, and
States. Central German administrative departments were
to be established to direct certain essential economic
activities on a nation-wide basis; finance, transporta
tion, communication, foreign trade, and industry. Free
dom of speech, press, religion, and trade-unionism were
to be guaranteed in each zone. During the period of
occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic
unit; common economic policies were to be evolved by the
Allied Control Council in Berlin. Production of war
materials was prohibited and production of metals, chemi
cals and machinery 'rigidly controlled and restricted to
Germany's approved postwar peacetime needs.' Excess
productive capacity might be used for reparation purposes.
Proceeds from German exports were, in the first instance,
to pay for imports.^1
The three great powers agreed at Potsdam that their reparations claims
would be taken from German external assets in their control and from the re-
42
movals of capital equipment in the respective occupation zones. The Soviet
wanted, in addition to capital equipment and plant removals, reparations out
of current production. The United States resisted the Sovier's demands for
raids on current production which would require deliveries of food and raw
materials into the western zones at Western expense.
41
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What were the initial purposes of United States occupation of Germany?
At the beginning the problem was viewed primarily as one preventing Germany
from reorganizing and traveling the path of an aggressor nation. The United
States and Great Britain were cognizant of the importance of the German economy
to that of the European economy. No so with the Soviet Union, she was con
cerned with the reconstruction of her economy and permanently weakening the
economy of Western Europe. Perhaps the Soviet position concerning the
German economy is best demonstrated by her demand for $10,000,000,000 in re
parations, and this out of current production. Also the Soviet Union refused
to account for many industrial plants removed from its zone to the Soviet
Union. In essence the Russians - in violation of agreements made at Potsdam -
devised its own plan for reparations and refused to treat Germany as an economic
. 44
unit.
There were many problems in Germany that required some consultation
among the officials in the four zones. These problems were: displaced persons,
inter-zonal movement, refugees, expelles, and currency. In many cases the
Russians refused to cooperate.45 The growing hostility between East and West
as well as the inability to reach mutually satisfactory agreement within the
Allied Control Council, caused the United States to chart a different course
46
in Germany.
On September 6, 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes in a speech at Stuttgart,
Germany outlined the change in United States policy toward Germany. He
43Reitzel, op. cit., p. 143.
44Dulles, op. cit., p. 227.
Reitzel, op. cit., p. 144.
46.Leonard, op. cit., pp. 350-351.
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asserted:
The United States is firmly of the belief that Germany should
be administered as an economic unit and that zonal barriers
should be completely obliterated so far as the economic
life and activity in Germany are concerned. The condition
which now exists in Germany make it impossible for in
dustrial production to reach the levels which the occupy
ing powers agreed were essential for a minimum German peace
time economy. Obviously, if the agreed levels of industry
are to be reached, we cannot continue to restrict the
free exchange of commodities, persons, and ideas through
out Germany.^
This "new approach" involved joining the American and British zones and later
the French sector in a tri-zonal arrangement.^ This policy shift was also
due to lack of progress on a German Peace treaty. Peace treaties were con
cluded with Italy, and the "captive" countries of Eastern Europe, but the
Council of Foreign Ministers could not agree on peace treaties for Austria
and Germany.
The intransigency of the Soviet policy-makers led to the decision of the
United States to establish a West German government. A civilian occupation
government replaced the military occupation administration, and later administra
tion was given to. the West German government.->0 In view of East-West dif
ferences, and the expansionist designs of the Soviet Union, it was inevitable
that the idea of rearming West Germany would occur to American policy-makers.
47Ibid., p. 355.
48Ibid., p. 350.
49Dulles, op. cit., pp. 229-231.
50
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On September 4, 1950, John J. McCloy, United States Commissioner for
Germany, stated:
In some manner, in some form the Germans should be
enabled, if they want to, to defend their own
country. It seems so difficult to say to these
people that you can't share in the defense of your
country if you're attacked. If that sounds like
rearmament then it's rearmament.51
The French objected to the rearmament of West Germany. The French did not
want Germany's rearmament without controls, for a rearmed Germany, with no
strings attached, would place France's "Old enemy" in a position to dominate
52
Western Europe.
The French were aware that they could not block West German rearmament
indefinitely, especially in view of the military weakness in the other
Western European nations, and the pressure from the United States to accept
the plan.5"3 In order to get the best possible deal out of German rearmament,
French diplomats tied approval of the Schuman and Plenen plans to German re
armament.54 The Schuman plan called for a merger of Western European steel
producing facilities. The Pleven Plan consisted of the assimilation of
West German units into a European army.55 West German leaders took the
position that if the West wanted West Germany rearmed, West Germany should be
given sovereign status.
51John J. McCloy, cited in Richard C. Snyder and Edgar S. Furniss,
American Foreign Policy (New York, 1954), p. 702.
52Ibid., p. 703.
53Reitzel, op. cit., pp. 151-155.
54Ibid.. p. 152.
55Snyder, op. cit., 703.
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Three elements were involved in West German rearmament: a European
army, a merger of West European steel-producing facilities, and the re
sumption of full sovereignty by Germany.56 After many months of negotia
tion the rearmament of West Germany was approved by the United States,
France and Britain.
The Soviet Union vigorously protested the West's action in Germany.
Soviet counter-action to the West policy in West Germany included the
Berlin blockade (June, 1948 to May, 1949), the establishment of a German
state in her zone, and the consolidation of her control in Eastern Europe.
The Soviet Union next applied pressure to West Berlin, which is deep
within the Soviet Zone of Germany, causing a threat to peace in June, 1948.
The Russian military authorities cut off all supplies by road, canal, and
58
rail, thus isolating West Berlin. The allies had agreed that the city of
Berlin would be divided into four zones, each to be occupied by one of the
four great powers, a governing body, composed of four city commandants
selected by their respective commanders-in-chief, would be organized to
direct its administration jointly.59 It appears that the Western powers did
not take into consideration the military implications of their location in
Berlin. Western military authorities did not attempt to acquire a written
agreement pledging Western personnel access to Berlin.60
56Reitzel, op. cit.. pp. 154-157.
57Ibid., pp. 156-157.
58William Henry Chamberlin, Beyond Containment (Chicago, 1953), p. 57.
59W. Phillips Davison, The Berlin Blockade (Princeton, 1958), p. 39.
60Lucius D. Clay, Decision in Germany (New York, 1950), p. 26.
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This effort on the part of the Russians to force the Western powers out
of Berlin was met by bold counter-action. General Lucius D. Clay, American
Commander, asked permission to send an armed convoy into the Soviet zone.
This recommendation was turned down. American policy-makers decided to oppose
Soviet power politics in the city by airlifting 8,000 tons of supplies per
fi 9
month to the two and one-half million people. The Berlin blockade created
a highly critical situation, in fact, American military planners seriously
discussed the possibility of war with the Soviet Union. President Truman
indicated that the idea of withdrawing from Berlin had or would not be con
sidered. The Berlin blockade was lifted in May of 1949.
The Berlin airlift demonstrated that the United States was determined to
block Soviet expansion and aggression. The question is often asked "What is
the importance of Berlin?" Militarily it is of little or no value but poli
tically it serves as an outpost within the "iron curtain," and perhaps as long
as Western forces remain in this enclave, Berlin will serve as a symbol for
the future unification of Germany.
Another area of tension between the United States and Russia included
the demands placed upon Turkey by Russia in 1946. The Soviet Union notified
the Turks that the twenty-year-old Treaty of Friendship and neutrality between
the two countries was terminated.65 Foreign minister Molotov informed the
61Chamberlin, op. cit., p. 95.
62Ibid., p. 96.
63Dulles, op. cit., pp. 240-241.
64Ibid., p. 241.
65Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York, 1955), p. 60.
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Turkish ambassador that Turkey could have a new treaty if she agreed to the
following demands:
1. Cession to the Soviet Union of the Turkish districts
of Kars, Ardahan, Artnin, near Russo-Turkish border
in the Caucasus. These had been acquired by the
Russians in 1878 and returned to the Turks after
World War I.
2. Revision of the Montreux convention governing the
Straits. The Russians wanted a new regime ad
ministered by the Black Sea powers (Russia and
Turkey) with third-nation interest eliminated.
3. Lease to the Soviet Union of strategic bases for
naval and land forces in the Straits for "joint
defense" purposes.
4. Abandonment by Turkey of her British associations
and the conclusion of a treaty similar to those the
Soviets were concluding with their Balkan Satel
lites.66
The Turks, with the knowledge that the United States would support
their position, refused these demands. The Soviet Union also addressed notes
to the United States and Great Britain concerning her demands of Turkey.
President Truman and his advisers agreed that the Soviet proposals be re
jected regardless of the consequences.67 The United States' reply to the
Soviet Union stated:
It is the firm opinion of this government that Turkey
should continue to be primarily responsible for the
defense of the Straits. Should the Straits become
the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggres
sor the resulting situation would constitute a threat
to international security and could clearly be a
matter for action on the post of the Security Council








The Soviet government reacted to the refusal of Turkey to accede to her
demands by moving troops along the Russo-Turkish border, diplomatic pressure,
and a barrage of propaganda. Following the now familiar pattern of "cold war
chess," the United States ordered a task force to the Mediterranean Sea.^
American authorities felt that accession to Soviet proposals would lead to
communist control of Turkey and thereby open a gateway to the Middle East for
further Soviet expansion. In the face of Western opposition the Soviet Union
backed down.
In Greece Soviet interest and Western security clashed. Communist control
of Greece would flank the Straits and open the way to Soviet influence over
Turkey and Italy.71 Greece was in a critical condition as a result of the
military defeat administered at the hands of the German war machine and four
years of occupation. After World War II a group of communists led guerrillas
sought to bring Greece into the Soviet sphere of influence.72
The Greek problem was further complicated by the desperate condition of
73
its economy, and whether the Greek government enjoyed popular support.
In February, 1947, the British government gave Washington notice that
she would no longer be able to support the Greek government, economically of
militarily, in the bitter civil war. This action by the British would leave
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and the Middle East. The British notice also applied to Turkey. It was under
these pressures that Mr. Truman went to Congress requesting 400 million dollars
to aid Greece and Turkey in their struggle against communism.7^ President
Truman requested the aid on the grounds that it promoted the security of the
United States. Congress approved the request. ^ In 1948, a report of the
United Nations special Balkans Committee stated that "Greek guerrillas had
received war materials and other supplies from Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia,
and that the rebels had been allowed to use the territories of these countries
for tactical retreats from Greece."7^ The Greek rebels were defeated with the
assistance of the Military Aid Program and remedial internal measures taken
by the Greek government.77
The Middle East is also a point of contention between the "Super Powers."
The changed status of Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Syria, Lebanon,
Jordan and the creation of Israel invited power politics between the East and
West. This region is caught up in the anti-colonial revolution, and is striv
ing for self-expression.7^ After shaking off the chain of colonialism these
countries are not economically or militarily able to defend themselves against
the advances of a great or strong power. The region is rich in oil and supplies
about 80 per cent of the oil for Western Europe.79 The region has thus become
7^Dulles, op. cit., p. 111.
Brookings Institution, op. cit., p. 147.
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another facet of the East-West struggle, strategic and economic.80
After the wane of British influence in the area the United States took
the leadership of preventing Soviet control. The first case the United Nations
was called upon to settle involved the Western powers and the Soviet Union.
The dispute concerned the refusal ~of Russia to withdraw her troops from Iran. -^
The sovereignty of Iran had been guaranteed by the Teheran accords.°^ The
Soviet Union attempted to establish autonomy for the province of Azerbaijan
which borders the Soviet Union, and also pressured Iran to join the Soviet
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Union in a petroleum exploitation deal on Iranian territory. America aided
Iran by extending credits and military advisers and weapons. Russia finally
withdrew its troops from Iran and eased the pressure.
A major area of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union
is disarmament, both conventional and nuclear. The possession of nuclear wea
pons by the "Super Powers" raised the possibility of the extinction of man as
a form of life on earth. Below Philip Noel-Baker describes Hiroshima shortly
after the city was devastated by an atomic bomb in 1945:
People are still dying, mysteriously and horribly - people
who were uninjured in the cataclysm - from an unknown some
thing which I can only describe as the atomic plague.
Hiroshima does not look like a bombed city...I write these
facts as dispassionately as I can, in the hope that they
will act as a warning to the world. In this first testing
ground of the atomic bomb...it gives you an empty feeling
in the stomach to see such man-made devastation...1 could
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see about three miles of reddish rubble. That is all the
atomic bomb left...The Police Chief of Hiroshima...took
me to hospitals where the victims of the bombs are still
being treated. In these hospitals I found people who,
when the bomb fell, suffered absolutely no injuries, but
now are dying from the uncanny after-effects. For no
apparent reason their health began to fail. They lost
appetite. Their hair fell out. Bluish spots appeared
on their bodies and then bleeding began from the ears,
nose and mouth. At first, the doctors told me, they
thought these were the symptoms of general debility.
They gave their patients Vitamin A injections. The re
sults were horrible. The flesh started rotting away
from the hole caused by the injection of the needle and
in every case the victim died.
A peculiar odour...given off by the poisonous gas still
issues from the earth soaked with radioactivity; against
this the inhabitants all wear gauze over their mouths and
noses; many thousands of people have simply vanished - the
atomic heat was so great that they burned instantly to
ashes - except that there were no ashes - they were va
porised.85
The hydrogen bomb now out-ranks the above described atomic bomb in destruc
tive capacity. The problem of disarmament has occupied the thinking of
statesmen and policy-makers since 1945. °
The United States proposed in 1945 some form of international control
over the development of atomic energy. And that this energy be channeled
into peaceful uses. The United States stated its willingness to share atomic
energy secrets if proper safeguards concerning inspection and control could
87
be established. According to the United States proposal, the United Na
tions would have the responsibility of seeing that atomic energy was used for
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peaceful purposes, after adequate measures for control and inspection had
88
been enacted. Bernard Baruch, American representative on the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission, presented the formal proposal which also provides
for elimination of the veto in matters concerning the illegal manufacture of
atomic bombs. The Baruch Plan also called for an international authority that
would own all atomic plants and would have the powers of licensing, accounting,
and inspection. At this time the United States alone had the bomb.
The Soviet Union countered the Baruch proposal with a plan which sought
the destruction of all existing nuclear weapons and legal restrictions against
their future manufacture. After the destruction of all nuclear weapons and
a treaty outlawing atomic weapons, the Soviets would then approve international
inspection.^ The obstacle in this case appears to be one of priorities. The
United States insisted upon international inspection and control of atomic
energy prior to the destruction of existing nuclear weapons and the Soviets
wanted disarmament first and control later. The failure to achieve disarmament
90
is centered around mutual distrust between the super powers.
According to Professor John G. Stoessinger the matter of priorities
still obstructs disarmament agreement. He stated:
The United States and the Soviet Union have both agreed
that a variable disarmament treaty would have to in
clude provisions for the prohibition of nuclear weapons
as well as acceptable arrangements for control. The
Soviet Union has consistently defended the priority of
prohibition in numerous "ban the bomb" proposals. The




Stoessinger, op. cit., pp. 350-351.
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which fears that the Soviet Union would not accede to con
trol once prohibition is accepted...Should this occur, the
United States would find itself confronted by the combined
land armies of the Soviet Union and Communist China...with
out an atomic bomb...The Soviets regard international
inspection as a form of espionage.°^
The nuclear stalemate also hopelessly deadlocked the prospect of limiting
conventional armaments. Today the super powers - with lesser powers attempt




EMERGENCE OF A STRATEGIC CONCEPT
As American foreign policy-makers became aware of the aggrandizement
motives of the Soviet Union, the question arose, in what manner should Soviet
moves be combatted. In the search for a policy to counter Soviet expansion
United States policy-makers had to consider the military, political, and
economic capabilities of the United States. Also of paramount importance
was the traditional content of American foreign policy as it relates to
Europe and the world. Then too, the ideologies of the two super-powers had
to be taken into consideration.
With the expansionist design of the Soviet Union made abundantly clear,
how did the United States stack up militarily against the Soviet Union? At
the end of World War II, American armed forces were rapidly returned home,
and Congress cut appropriations for the military.
This action placed American policy-makers in a dilemma; how to play the
role of a leading world power without the military force that is very essential
to translate foreign policy into action. The army was reduced from eight
million to two million men by July, 1946. This small army held positions in
Europe and the Far East. Out of the 218 combat air groups in 1945, only two
worthy of the name remained in 1947. The manpower of the navy was reduced
■'■William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, American
Foreign Policy 1945-1955 (Washington, D. C, 1956), pp. 48-49.




from 3.4 to 1.6 million by 1947. As indicated above, the United States'
forces were weak. The one major advantage held by the United States was that
of the atomic bomb. This atomic monopoly by the United States was estimated
at that time to be good for at least seven years.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union had six million men under arms
and an effective air force. Information also indicated that the Soviet air
craft industry was re-tooling in order to build newer and better planes.
Compulsory military training was also in effect in the Soviet Union which
enabled it to keep its armed forces in a state of effectiveness. American
military planners estimated that if the Soviet Union so desired, it could
over-run all of Europe, except possibly Great Britain.
What is the nature of the ideological clash of the two super-powers as
it relates to the power struggle? In the Soviet Union the notion is held that
capitalism is basically "evil" and that it will inevitably be destroyed. The
Soviets feel that they are the only direct heirs of Karl Marx and thus the
only "truly" socialist nation.** The Soviet Union and the United States re
present two different political, economic and social systems. There is a
thread of innate antagonism between capitalism and socialism. George F.
3Reitzel, op. cit., pp. 89-91.
^Morgenthau, op. cit., pp. 167-169.
Reitzel, op. cit.
6Ibid., p. 100.




The first of these concepts is that of the innate an
tagonism between capitalism and socialism. We have
seen how deeply that concept has become imbedded in
foundations of Soviet power. It has profound implications
for Russia's conduct as a member of international society.
It means that there can never be on Moscow's side any
sincere assumption of a community of aims between the
Soviet Union and powers which are regarded as capita
lism. It must invariably be assumed in Moscow that
the aims of the capitalist world are antagonistic to
the Soviet regime and, therefore, to the interests of
the peoples it controls....^
Today, we find western democratic ideology on the defensive. This is
a reversal of the early position of democratic ideology. Communism attempts
to equate western democracy with fascism, that is, fascism is indigenous to
the social, economic, and political structure of the West. Communism's
appeal is not limited to any particular race or ethnic group nor to a certain
geographic area. It is not dependent upon a particular form or structure of
government. It may also be an underground organization, or a major political
party appealing to the people. Communists may utilize subversion and sabo-
12
tage to win control.
Finally, Communist ideology is much more difficult to combat than
fascism because of its broad base of appeal. Its dogma is sophisticated and
offers something to practically everyone: the dialectic to the intellectual,
better conditions for the worker, humanitarianism and equality in the future
9Ibid., p. 95.
Richard C. Snyder, and Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., American Foreign Policy




for the democrat. As Professor Stoessinger states, it offers a coherent
secular religion:
The dictator becomes God, the only God for that matter;
and the Party becomes the Church. As a variant, col
lective leadership becomes a sort of Trinity. The
central committee and the local leaders take care of
polythestic needs. The parallels could be pressed
further. The point is that all essential mundane
elements of religion except the Virgin Mother are
represented. ^
And to further compound the problem the Soviet Union lays claim to the termi
nology of the Western Democratic Nations: equality, liberty, popular rights,
14
sovereignty, and democracy.
The foregoing demonstrates that the Soviet Union has at its command
foreign policy instruments that vary greatly from traditional foreign policy
devices. If this is true, then it follows that the search for a policy
presents a difficult problem for planners in an attempt to counter Soviet
moves. Now this writer is not implying that ideological considerations are
the central themes in the cold war struggle, but that ideology plays a major
role.
We will briefly examine the political and economic conditions of the
major countries in Western Europe at the emergence of the policy of contain
ment. In 1947, Great Britain's economy was very weak. The heavy damages
inflicted on the British during the war began their telling effects. Ameri
can policy-makers knew that the economy of Great Britain was essential to the
recovery of Western Europe. The loan of 1946 proved to be only a shot in the
13John G. Stoessinger, The Might of Nations (New York, 1961), p. 57.
14
Snyder, op. cit., p. 592.
15Frederick L. Schuman, Russia Since 1917 (New York, 1957), p. 357.
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arm for the British economy. In France and Italy the conditions were similar,
except in these two countries the largest communist parties outside the
Soviet Union existed. There was danger that the communist parties would take
over power in France and Italy, thereby opening the floodgate of Communism
to Western Europe. The United States, after the War, had made a large num
ber of loans and grants to England, France, and Italy. Also the United States
provided the bulk of the four billion dollars spent by UNRRA to aid war-torn
areas. It became apparent in 1947, that the piecemeal progress, being
employed, would not solve the economic problems of the above named countries.
Some long range plans that would get at the root of Western Europe's econo
mic ills had to be placed in operation. This was part of the problem for
18
American policy-makers if Europe was to be saved from Communism. America
took the lead in attempting to mobilize the countries of Western Europe
against communist control. This was a struggle for political power, and a
19
struggle between incompatible ideologies. The stakes involved not only na
tional security but also whether Western type democracy would continue to
20
exist in Western Europe.
It was against the backdrop of the above-stated forces that a strategic
concept was developed. According to William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and
Constance G. Coblenz, the high level conduct of foreign relations, as in the
16Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Tides of Crises (New York, 1957), pp. 112-114.
17Ibid., p. 287.





high level planning of "organized violence," a pattern of objectives and
policies cannot be reoriented without the development of a parallel strate-
21
gic concept. This is an "agreed view on how to proceed; in which places,
by what means, at what times, and in what order." A strategic concept
involves policy decisions, that is, a set of rules to guide future conduct
within a set pattern of objectives. Decision makers agree on a definite
set of rules for the interpretation of anticipated events, for the solution
of recurring problems and also for guidance in the selection of objectives
and techniques for future action. ■* Out of the strategic concept grew the
policy of containment. The containment policy meant that certain acts of
the Soviet Union would be regarded as detrimental to the interests of the
United States, and therefore, would be opposed by positive acts by the United
States.2^ According to this policy the United States would confine the Soviet
Union within its spheres of influence at that time.
The concept containment was publicly stated by George F. Kennan, writing
under the pseudonym "X" in Foreign Affairs in 1947. Mr. Kennan held that
the United States policy should be to "contain Soviet power by adroit and vi
gilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting
geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers
21Reitzel, op. cit., p. 99.
22Ibid., p. 99.
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of Soviet Policy."25 The United States' official policy now reflected the
view that the United States and Russia had basically conflicting philosophies
and that the world was divided into two camps.
The concept of containment was first given expression in the Truman
Doctrine in March, 1947. The Truman Doctrine was first applied in Greece and
Turkey. As cited earlier in this paper, the British government notified
Washington in February, 1947, that she would no longer be able to support the
Greek government, which was engaged in a civil war with local communists,
economically or militarily. The fall of the Greek government to the insur
gents would open the area to further Soviet expansion.
On March 12, 1947, President Truman addressed a joint session of the
House and Senate of the United States concerning aid to Greece and Turkey.
He stated:
...the gravity of the situation which confronts the
world today necessitates my appearance before a joint
session of the Congress. The foreign policy and the
national security of this country are involved....
One aspect of the present situation...concerns Greece
and Turkey...Greece must have assistance if it is to
become a self-respecting democracy. The United States
must supply this assistance. There is no other country
to which democratic Greece can turn. No other nation
is willing and able to provide necessary support for a
democratic Greek government. One of the primary ob
jectives of the foreign policy of the United States is
the creation of conditions in which we and other nations
will be able to work out a way of life free from coersion....
Thus Truman gave the broad outlines of the Truman Doctrine, a policy that was
radically different from traditional American foreign policy. This policy
"X", "Sources of Soviet Conduct," America's Foreign Policy, ed., Harold
K. Jacobson (New York, I960), p. 203.
26Cited in Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York, 1955), pp.
19-21.
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was the forerunner of even broader and more extensive foreign assistance.
Through military assistance, economic aid and American military advisers, the
Greek government was saved from Soviet domination.27
Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in a speech at Harvard University
June 5, 1947, made public a new approach to the containment policy. This
was the Marshall Plan, a massive plan aimed at the economic reconstruction of
Europe. Secretary Marshall said: "It would be neither fitting nor effica
cious for this government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program de
signed to place Europe on its feet economically.... The initiative, I think,
28
must come from Europe." It will be recalled that Western Europe at this
time was dangerously close to economic collapse and it was feared that local
communists would use this opportunity to take power.
The Marshall Plan called for an economic program for nations on both
sides of the "iron curtain" to be jointly administered by the United States,
France, and Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The objective of this plan
29
was to rebuild a prosperous Europe. A conference was held in Paris to iron
out details of the program. The Soviet Union's delegation did not agree with
the plan and left the meeting denouncing the program as one of economic im
perialism.30 The Soviets contended that the Marshall Plan was designed to
relegate Europe to the status of an economic vassal of the United States.
Thus the United States was saved from the problem of Soviet participation by
27Ibid., pp. 67-77.
oq
Reitzel, op. cit., p. 118.
29
Berle, op. cit., p. 112.
'ibid., pp. 112-113.30
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the Soviet walk-out. In view of the anti-Soviet climate of opinion in
the United States at that time, it is doubtful whether the Congress would
have approved the Marshall Plan had the Soviet Union been included.
The Marshall Plan or Economic Cooperation Act passed the Congress and
went into effect April 3, 1948. Fourteen Western European countries ac
cepted the Marshall Plan and agreed to establish the Committee of European
Economic Cooperation (CEEC) to gather information and co-ordinate the
policies of the participating countries. The four year program amounted
to about twelve billion dollars in American aid. The European Recovery
Program was not completely altruistic even from an economic point of view.
This program extended the market for American goods and aided the economy
32
of the United States. The program also served to raise the standard of
living among the peoples of Western Europe and checked the advance of
33
Communism.
The Marshall Plan, which was primarily economic, aided the participating
nations in rebuilding their cities, put new machinery in factories, and a
host of other things necessary to rebuild the economies of these countries.
The program succeeded and, by 1955, the gross national product in most
34
member countries had increased to a point well above the pre-war level.






The Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, (Marshall Plan) intended that:
1. The recovery of Europe as a whole was vital to world
recovery and was a prerequisite for achieving the
general aims of the United States commercial and
financial policy.
2. In the interest of American security, strong mea
surements had to be taken to check the advance of
Communism in Europe.
3. The Communist threat took the form of exploiting
low standards of living and economic stagnation,
rather than avert military aggression.
4. The most suitable way to counteract this form of
threat was to use economic and financial resour-
ces.35
There is little doubt that the Marshall Plan improved the economy of
Western Europe and helped to prevent it from going Communist. This program
also brought about a great deal of cooperation among the countries of Western
Europe. An example of this is the European Payments Union (EPU) which en
ables trade to flow freely among the member countries.
American policy-makers felt that it was not enough to place Western
Europe on its feet economically. They saw the need for some type of regional
defense set up. After talks with the Brussels Pact members and Canada, the
Truman Administration presented to the Senate the North Atlantic Treaty.
President Truman reported that negotiations were proceeding and that:
The primary purpose of these agreements is to provide
unmistakable proof of the joint determination of the
free countries to resist armed attack from any quar
ter.... If we can make it sufficiency clear, in ad
vance, that any armed attack affecting our national
security would be met with overwhelming force, the
35Reitzel, op. cit., p. 376.
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armed attack might never occur.
The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in July, 1948. This pact, which now
includes fifteen members, provides for mutual defense and aid in case of
attack. The North Atlantic Treaty was attacked by many on the grounds that
it by-passed the United Nations, and sanctioned the commitment of United
37
States troops to Europe. A group of senators opposed to alliances, at
tempted to amend the treaty against stationing United States troops in
Europe, against furnishing arms, armaments, military, naval, or air-craft,
38
and atomic information or bombs. The opposition lost and on July 21, 1949,
the North Atlantic Treaty was approved by a vote of 82 to 13.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was found under Article
51 of the United Nations which authorizes regional pacts. There are indica
tions that American policy has shifted the United Nations to a secondary
role. Article five of the pact states:
The parties agree that an armed attack against one or
more of them in Europe or North America shall be con
sidered an attack against them all; and consequently
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each
of them, in exercise of the right of individual or
collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of
the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the
Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, in
dividually and in concert with the other Parties, such
as it deems necessary, including the use of armed
force, to restore and maintain the security of the
North Atlantic Area.39
36Ibid.. p. 126.
37Berle, op. cit.. p. 244.
38Reitzel, op. cit., p. 127.
39Ibid.. p. 127.
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The North Atlantic Treaty was a clear break with tradition for the
United States and its relation with Europe.
NATO also provides for economic collaboration among the member countries.
The North Atlantic Council, in 1950, approved an integrated defense plan for
the member countries. An elaborate land, sea, and air defense was set up on
paper, but until this date it has not been fully realized. Some of the mem
ber countries have not made the necessary military contributions.^ The
Mutual Assistance Act was passed in October, 1949. This Act provides one
and one-half billion for the first year of the program. This appropriation
provided the funds necessary to implement NATO. Funds to the NATO members
would be released upon bilateral agreements with the requesting country to
insure that the military planning satisfied the United States. The military
spending in Western Europe also aided the economies, for example, aircraft
contracts to build NATO planes were given to France. It also aided the eco
nomy of the United States. The explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb in 1949,
and the hydrogen bomb in 1953, encouraged NATO members to greater effort.
The Soviets contended that NATO violated the Anglo-Soviet and French-
Soviet treaties of 1942 and 1944, and was also a violation of the U. N.
Charter. The Soviets then formed its counter-part of NATO, the Warsaw Pact.
With the charting of NATO extended, the strategy of containment to
include the concept of collective security alliances. The methods and ob
jectives of the strategic concept changes as the situations change. The
goal is the same, to prevent further Soviet expansion.
40Ibid., p. 133.
41Schuman, op. cit., pp. 371-372.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY AND EVALUATION
In the years immediately following the Second World War the United
States found that she could not depend completely upon the United Nations to
insure peace in the world. America had to re-examine her entire conception
of world affairs. Among other factors, the pressures of Soviet expansion,
and the weaknesses of France and Great Britain, forced the United States in
to the position of world leadership. As the Soviet Union attempted to spread
her influence beyond the areas held at the end of World War II, the United
States sought to contain communism through economic and military assistance,
collective defense agreements, and when necessary, military force.
Some sectors of American public opinion objected to these "entangling
alliances." Some of the more extreme voices suggested that the Western
Hemisphere did not need Europe for its defense, that it could stand alone in
a sea of communism. Other "neo-isolationists" felt that United States de
fense outside the Western Hemisphere should depend upon naval and air power.
The "new isolationists" stated that American policy in Europe was likely to
cause war. Unlike the "old-isolationists," the "new isolationists" wanted
the Soviet Union checked, or so they stated, but this group opposed programs
designed to halt Communism's spread. The "new isolationists," a conservative




group, were led by the late Senator Robert A. Taft.2
The proponents of collective security struck back at their critics by
attempting to show the calamitous results of a retreat by the United States
from world responsibilities. President Truman and Secretary Acheson stated
the security of the United States was dependent upon American commitment to
Europe and that there could be no return to the past. Policy-makers pointed
out that the job of safe-guarding peace and democracy had to be done by the
3
United States and her allies in the West.
In this work we have pointed up the paradoxical nature of the United
States1 isolationist policy toward Europe. Although George Washington and
other "Founding Fathers" admonished the United States to stay out of European
politics, this country has engaged in armed action with European powers six
times. This writer's contention is that the United States has remained iso
lated when it served the interests of this nation, and cooperated when co
operation best served her interests. Some of the reasons the United States
has not been involved in European affairs more frequently, are the following:
(1) A large interior to settle; (2) all of the Americas to establish hegemony
over; (3) four thousand miles of ocean between it and Europe; and (4) en-
lighten self-interest.
We noted that some of the factors contributing to feelings of hostility
between the United States and the Soviet Union were: (1) United States inter
vention in Siberia; (2) delayed recognition of the Soviet government by the
2Foster Rhea Dulles, America's Rise to World Power 1898-1954 (New York,
1954), pp. 324-326.
3Ibid., p. 233.
George H. Blakeslee, Recent Foreign Policy of the United States (New
York, 1925), pp. 15-20.
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United States; (3) world revolution to which the Soviet Union is committed;
(4) the sudden termination of lend-lease to the Soviet Union, and (5) ideo
logical prejudices. No solutions to the problems between the super-powers
appear at this time.
None of the major areas of tension between the Soviet Union and the
United States has been solved. Germany is still divided, Berlin is still a
"hot spot," and there is a deadlock on disarmament, plus a host of other
problems.
In this writer's opinion, Europe is important in the East-West Con
flict, for the most part, because of its great intellectual and industrial
productivity. This area has also contributed much to the cultural heritage
of the United States. Western Europe is still the "heartland" of Europe
and will be fundamental in determining the outcome of the struggle between
the Soviet Union and the United States. Another important factor in the
United States' commitments to Western Europe is the matter of market areas.
These areas of central and Eastern Europe, now dominated by the Soviets, were
formerly outlets for manufactured goods from the West.
As a result of the lessons of two world wars, and radical development
in military technology, the United States has been forced to alter its
foreign policy. After World War II, the balance of power concept was dis
carded. There was no third state or combination of states that could equal
the power of the United States or the Soviet Union. The radical change in
military technology saw the development of atomic weapons, guided missiles,
Jacobson, op. cit., pp. 419-420.
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the alteration of sea power, and the increase in fire power and mobility
of land troops. Greater dependence was also placed upon air power. The
shift to "global responsibilities" in American foreign policy thinking
was facilitated in some degree by Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, Berlin,
and other areas.
It is unquestionable that the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan,
NATO, and the Mutual Assistance Program have helped to prevent Western
Europe from falling into the Soviet orbit. Although containment, as en
visaged by the United States, is essentially a negative policy, it prevented
Soviet domination of Western Europe. This writer feels that the concept of
containment can be formulated into a bold imaginative policy that will take
the initiative away from the Soviet Union. This could be done by not
waiting until an area is threatened by communism to act. Organizations such
as the Common Market in Europe could be supported by the United States in
other areas. The Alliance for Progress is a case in point. The United
States allowed the communists to gain a foothold in Latin America before
acting. An imaginative policy of containment would attempt to support
governments in troubled areas that are democratic or at least pressure the
officials of the particular governments into social, economic and political
reforms. Basic reforms would insure more United States aid reaching the
masses in the particular countries.
Barring some dramatic settlement between the United States and the
Soviet Union, such as military disengagement from Europe by the United
States and mutual withdrawal of Soviet and Western forces from Germany,
American foreign policy in Europe will continue to be a cancer.
6Dulles, op, cit., p. 229.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books
Acheson, Dean. Power and Diplomacy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1958.
Bailey, Thomas A. A Diplomatic History of the American People. New York:
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Incorporated, 1950.
Barlett, Ruhl J. The Record of American Diplomacy. New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1947.
Beard, Charles A. The Idea of a National Interest. New York: The
Macmillian Company, 1934.
. American Foreign Policy in the Making. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1946.
Bemis, Samuel F. A Diplomatic History of the United States. New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1955.
Berle, Adolf A., Jr. Tides of Crisis. New York: Regal and Company, 1957.
Blakeslee, George H. The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States. New
York: Henry Holt and Company, 1955.
Chamberlin, Lawrence H. and Snyder, Richard C. American Foreign Policy.
New York: Rinehart and Company, Incorporated, 1948.
Chamberlin, William Henry. Beyond Containment. Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1953.
Churchill, Winston S. Triumph and Tragedy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 1953.
Clay, Lucius D. Decision in Germany. New York: Doubleday and Company,
1950.
Davison, W. Phillips. The Berlin Blockade. Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1958.
Dulles, Foster Rhea. America's Rise to Power 1898-1954. New York: Harper
and Brothers Publication, 1954.
Graves, William S. America's Siberian Adventure. New York: Jonathan Cape
and Harrison Smith, 1931.




Jones, Joseph M. The Fifteen Weeks. New York: Viking Press, 1955.
Kennan, George F. Realities of American Foreign Policy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1954.
. American Diplomacy. Chicago: A Mentor Book, 1951.
Russia the Atom and the West. New York: Harper and
Brothers Publication, 1957.
The Decision to Intervene. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1958.
Leonard, L. Larry. Elements of American Foreign Policy. New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Incorporated, 1953.
Lippmann, Walter. Isolation and Alliances. Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1952.
Morgenthau, Hans J. Politics Among Nations. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1948.
. In Defense of the National Interest. New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1951.
Mowrer, Paul Scott. Our Foreign Affairs. New York: E. P. Dutton and
Company, 1924.
Odegard, Peter H. American Government, Theory, Politics, and Constitutional
Foundation. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Incorporated, 1960.
Perkins, Dexter. Foreign Policy and American Spirit. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1957.
Reitzel, William, Kaplan, Morton A., and Coblenz, Constance G. United
States Foreign Policy 1945-1955. Washington: The Brookings
Institution, 1956.
Sears, Louis M. A History of American Foreign Relations. New York: Thomas
Y. Crowell Company, 1957.
Schuman, Frederick L. Russia Since 1917. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1957.
. International Politics. New York: 6th Edition,
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Incorporated, 1958.
Shub, David. Lenin. New York: The New American Library, 1948.
Snyder, Richard C, and Furni'ss, Edgar S., Jr. American Foreign Policy.
New York: Rinehart and Company, Incorporated, 1954.
63
Stoessinger, John G. The Might of Nations. New York: Random House, 1961.
